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 DISCUSSION
 WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT?*
 PAVEL TICH?
 University of Otago
 1. Introduction. By observing a black swan, one ascertains an interesting zoological
 fact. The fact involves two items, a specific object and the property of being a
 black swan, and consists in the former instantiating the latter. The object is in
 itself of little interest. Our environment abounds in objects, and knowledge is
 hardly enhanced by one of them being merely picked out for consideration. The
 same goes for the property. Properties are at least as plentiful as objects and one
 does not get to know anything by merely focussing attention upon one of them.
 What is of interest is the combination of the two items, i.e. the circumstance that
 the object instantiates the property. And this is what the said fact consists in.
 The above triviality would be hardly worth stating if it were not for a consider-
 able number of philosophers anxious to deny it. These philosophers are adamant
 that there are no such items as properties. They have to deny, therefore, that a
 fact can consist in a particular instantiating such an item. It is not my intention
 to quarrel with this extremist view. Rather, I am addressing myself to those who
 concede that besides concrete particulars like persons, birds, chairs, and ink marks,
 there are things which may or may not be true of such particulars, and that these
 latter things are not concrete particulars in turn (especially not ink marks or
 sequences of such) but abstract conditions or attributes: colors, temperatures,
 chemical constitutions, party affiliations and the like. In what follows I shall assume
 that over and above extensional entities-truth-values, individuals, numbers, classes
 of individuals, classes of ordered n-tuples of individuals, and the like-the reader
 countenances also corresponding intensional entities, that is, propositions,
 individuals-in-intension, magnitudes, properties, relations, and so on.
 Recent developments in logical theory forestall many objections which used
 to be raised against intensions. In particular, they forestall the objection that
 intensions are difficult to individuate. For it turns out that intensions are best
 explicated as a special brand of functions and we know perfectly well how to
 individuate functions. The functions in question are defined on the family of
 possible worlds (or on parts thereof) and range over extensions of appropriate
 types. Thus, propositions take possible worlds to truth values, individuals-in-
 intension take possible worlds to individuals, magnitudes take them to numbers,
 properties to classes, and n-ary relations to classes of ordered n-tuples. The value
 of an intension at a particular world is spoken of as its extension in that world.
 The point I want to raise with those who do not balk at intensions and their
 explication in terms of possible worlds is one about reference. It seems to me that
 * Received April, 1971.
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 despite the recent resurgence of the intensional point of view, it has not been
 sufficiently appreciated yet that intensions figure prominently among the entities
 we commonly talk about. There seems to be a strong tendency to regard an intension
 as something that normally serves as a mere vehicle of reference, the real target
 of reference being an extension.
 This tendency is stronger in regard to some types of intension and somewhat
 weaker in regard to others. There is, for instance, an almost universal consensus
 that the phrase 'the morning star' in
 (1) The morning star is a planet
 refers to Venus, the celestial body. It will be admitted that the phrase is somehow
 connected with an individual-in-intension, i.e. with a function which takes each
 possible world to the individual which appears as the brightest object in that
 world's morning sky. But this function is seen as representing a peculiar way in
 which the phrase refers to Venus-the value taken by the function at the actual
 world. It will be denied that the function itself receives reference in (1).
 Likewise, the phrase 'the number of Earth's natural satellites' in
 (2) The number of Earth's natural satellites is less than 3
 is usually construed to refer to the number 1. It will be admitted that the phrase
 is somehow associated with a magnitude, i.e. with a function which takes each
 possible world to whatever number of satellites Earth has in that world. But this
 function, it is held, only needs to be invoked to explain the peculiar way in which
 (2) refers to 1, i.e. to account for the fact that 1 is referred to qua the number of
 Earth's natural satellites. It will be denied that the magnitude itself receives refer-
 ence in (2).
 There is also a tendency to construe the sentence
 (3) Venus is a planet
 as treating of the class consisting of Mercury, Venus, Earth, ..., and Pluto.
 Again, it will be admitted that the term 'planet' has something to do with the property
 of being a planet, i.e. with the function which takes each possible world to the
 class of individuals which are the planets of that world. But it will be denied that
 this function receives reference in (3). The sentence, it will be said, is about the
 class of actual planets and says that Venus is a member of that class.
 The aim of the present article is to show that the above construals of sentences
 like (1), (2), and (3) are not only incompatible with the intensional point of view,
 but also conducive to semantic theories which are demonstrably inadequate from
 whatever philosophical point of view one may take.
 2. Classes and properties. To say of an individual that it is a member of a class
 makes a trivial statement. For as is well known classes are individuated by their
 memberships. Where X is a member of class C, it is inconceivable for C to lack X,
 since no class lacking X can be the same class as C; classes are not shrinkable:
 by subtracting X from C one obtains a class which is numerically distinct from C;
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 thus to say that X is a member of C is saying something that could not possibly
 have been otherwise. By the same token, if X is a nonmember of C, it is inconceiv-
 able for Xto belong to C; classes are not inflatable: by adding Xto C one obtains
 a different class; thus to say that X is a member of C is saying something which
 could not possibly have been the case. Sentence (3), however, is neither trivially
 true nor trivially false. It says something which, though true, might have been
 false. Consequently, the statement expressed by (3) cannot be to the effect that
 Venus is a member of a class.
 On the other hand, to say of an individual that it instantiates a property need
 not be trivial. A property may be instantiated by one class of objects in one world
 and by another class in another. Thus even if such a property P actually is in-
 stantiated by an individual X, it may still be possible for the very same P not to
 be instantiated by X. To say that X instantiates P is then saying something which,
 though true, might have been false. But in such a case what is being spoken of
 is an individual and a property: nothing is being said of any class.
 Let us write V, P, and C respectively for Venus, the property of being a planet
 and the class {Mercury, Venus, Earth, ..., Pluto}. P is thus a function from
 possible worlds to classes of individuals and takes C as its value at the actual
 world. Consider the proposition that V is a member of C. This proposition is
 true in a world W just in case V is in C. Thus the value of the proposition at W
 is CV and the proposition itself is constructible as
 (*) Aw. CV
 where w ranges over possible worlds. Now consider the proposition that Venus
 is a planet. This proposition is true in a world Wjust in case Venus is a member
 of the extension PW of P in W. The value of the proposition at W is thus [PW] V
 and the proposition itself is constructible as
 (3a) Aw. [Pw] V.
 I submit that the logical structure of the attributive statement (3) is correctly
 described by the formula at (3a). It differs essentially from (*), a formula which
 depicts the logical structure of a membership statement. Whereas (*) contains a
 class term C, (3a) contains no such term: the only self-contained components
 of (3a) are a property, P, and an individual, V. Whereas in (*) the abstraction
 operator Aw is applied to a closed formula and generates therefore a constant
 (i.e. trivial) function, in (3a) the operator binds an essential occurrence of w in
 its scope and generates a function which takes one truth value in some worlds
 and the other truth value in others.
 It is hardly surprising that the presence of the possible-world variable w is
 not visibly manifested in the surface structure of the ordinary-language sentence (3).
 It is a familiar fact that in ordinary language, bound variables are seldom visibly
 evinced and have to be unearthed by logical analysis. What is disturbing, however,
 is the fact that the presence of the variable w in the logical structure of (3) is
 systematically obliterated by the manner in which the sentence is symbolized in
 modern logical literature. It is an almost universal practice to symbolize (3) in
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 the manner 'PV' or 'P(V)'. This mode of notation creates an illusion that the
 term 'P' applies directly to V and that the whole sentence expresses a membership
 statement-a statement which declares Venus to be a member of a class. And
 once the sentence is misparsed in this way, there seems little doubt which particular
 class the sentence speaks of: it seems obvious that it speaks of C-the class of
 individuals which enjoy the property of planethood in the actual world.
 It is easy to show, however, that this analysis is wrong. The point is that (3)
 can be false despite Venus's being a member of C. For consider a possible world
 in which Venus fails to be a planet. In such a world (as in any world) it is true
 that Venus is a member of C (i.e. of the class consisting of Mercury, Venus,..., and
 Pluto), yet (3) is false. Now surely a sentence cannot be false in a state of affairs
 where what it says is the case. Consequently, what (3) says cannot be to the effect
 that Venus is a member of C (or any other class).
 3. Putnam on 'about'. The thesis that predicates like 'planet', 'crow', or 'black'
 denote properties rather than classes is implicit in several recent semantic theories.
 But the authors of these theories often unnecessarily obscure the matter by saying
 'class' where what they actually mean is a property. H. Putnam's attempt in [1]
 to explicate the subject matter of categorical statements (like 'All crows are black',
 'No crow is black', etc.) is a typical case in point.
 Putnam considers a first order language having a finite number of primitive
 monadic predicates P1,..., Pm and a fixed finite domain of individuals which
 are named in a one-to-one fashion by constants a,,..., a,. Any m. n-way con-
 junction which for any 1 < i < n and 1 < j < m contains either Pj(ai) or Pj(ai)
 but not both is said to be a state description. E.g. if m = 2 and n = 3
 (SO) Pl(al)Pl(a2)PI(a3)P2(al)P2(a2)P2(a3)
 is a state description. Each state description represents in an obvious manner
 one of the 2mn possible worlds allowed for by the language.
 Here is Putnam's crucial proposal.
 (D1) What a state description S says about a class C is defined as follows:
 a state description S may imply that the individuals designated by
 certain ai are not in C, in each case count C(ai) as "information about C";
 it may imply that the individuals designated by certain ai are in C, in
 each such case count C(ai) as "information about C"; and, in addition,
 every atomic or negated atomic constituent of S containing an ai desig-
 nating a member of C is to be counted as "information about C."
 Moreover, the sentence
 (4) C(aJ)C(a) ... C(aji)C(a,) ... C(ajp)
 Pl(ail) . . .PLm(ail). . Pkl(ai) ...Pkm(aik)
 (where a l,..., ai, are all the individuals ai such that C(a,) follows from
 the state description S, ajl,..., ajp are all the individuals aj such that
 C(aj) follows from S, and Pj, is the jth atomic predicate or negated
 83
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 atomic predicate which is such that Pli(ai,) follows from S) is said to
 express what S says about C.1
 On the face of it, Putnam seems to take it for granted that sentences of the
 language under consideration speak of classes: definition (Dl), taken literally,
 is of what S says about a class. But closer examination of the definition makes one
 wonder.
 The logical purist will be quick to point out that Putnam's definition sins against
 the use/mention distinction. In the definiendum, the symbol 'C' is clearly used to
 denote an unspecified class. In (4) and the legend attached to it, on the other
 hand, the symbol is mentioned: for here what are spoken of are formulas having
 that symbol as a component part.
 But sloppiness of this sort is often quite innocuous and easy to remove. To
 lay the use/mention purist's qualms at rest let us understand Putnam's definition
 as saying, strictly speaking, this: In order to obtain a formula expressing what S
 says about a given class, one picks an arbitrary (atomic or compound) predicate C
 which has the class as its extension; (4) then expresses what S says about that class.
 But there is a snag in this. Considering that a predicate may take different
 extensions in different worlds it does not quite make sense to require that the
 given class be the extension of C, period. The requirement must be, rather, that
 the given class be the extension of C in a specific world. The question arises which
 particular world should this be in our case?
 One answer that might suggest itself is this: the world in question is the actual
 one. In other words, it might be thought that (D1) is to be understood thus:
 to obtain a formula which expresses what S says about the given class, one takes
 a predicate C whose actual extension is that class and constructs (4).
 Construed in this way, however, (D1) is simply incorrect, since what it defines S
 to say about a given class depends on the choice of the predicate C. To see this,
 suppose the given class has a, as its only member and the actual world is the one
 represented by the state description
 Pl(a,)Pl(a2)Pl(a3)P2(a,)P2(a2)P2(a3).
 Now let us try to determine what So says about that class. Since clearly both PI
 and PPa2 (i.e. the conjunction of PI and P2) have {a,} as their actual extension,
 either can be plugged in as C in the schema (4). According as we choose P, or
 P,P2, we obtain either
 P1 (al)P (a3)Pl(a2)P (a,)P2(a,)P (a3)P2(a3)
 or
 P,P2(al)P,P2(a2)P (P2(a3)Pl(al)P2(al).
 These two formulas are far from equivalent. Hence, if the above construal of (D1)
 was the intended one, Putnam's proposal would be logically unsound.
 1 (Dl) is not a word by word quotation but a very close paraphrase of Putnam's definition
 as it appears on pp. 126-127 of [3]. The latter contains a number of minor misprints and
 notational inconsistencies which are corrected in (D1).
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 But surely Putnam can be trusted to know a logically defective definition when
 he sees one. Putnam is hardly guilty of a primitive error of this sort and conse-
 quently the way we have tentatively construed his definition above can hardly
 be faithful to his intentions. Let us then try again.
 There is a very simple way of making everything fall into place: by understanding
 Putnam to be defining what a state description says, not about a class (i.e. a collec-
 tion of individuals) but about a property (i.e. a function taking possible worlds
 to classes). If in (D1) we take the term 'class' to mean property, the use/mention
 purist's objection is easily disposed of. For the definition is then naturally under-
 stood as saying this: in order to obtain a formula expressing what S says about
 a given property, one picks an arbitrary (atomic or compound) predicate C which
 has the same extension as that property in every possible world, and constructs (4).
 Admittedly, there may still be more than one predicate satisfying this requirement.
 But any two such predicates will be logically equivalent and so will be the formulas
 obtained by plugging the predicates in the schema (4). The choice between the two
 predicates is thus completely immaterial, and the definition is logically impeccable.
 In some places Putnam unmistakably uses the term 'class' to speak about a
 property. For instance, he states that "a class may have different size in different
 'possible worlds"' ([3], p. 126). This statement would be patently wrong if Putnam
 adhered to the standard practice of using the term 'class' to mean simply a collection
 of objects. For any collection has clearly a unique size (cardinality) and is numeric-
 ally distinct from any collection of a different size. So Putnam must be referring
 not to a collection but to a function taking possible worlds to collections. His
 statement is clearly to be understood as saying that such a function may take
 different possible worlds to collections of different sizes.
 If so, then-using the standard terminology-Putnam's underlying assumption
 seems to be that categorical statements speak about properties, not classes. And
 this, of course, is a perfectly natural assumption to make. It is indeed in full
 accordance with our intuition to say that the sentence 'All crows are black' treats
 of two properties, that of being a crow and that of being black. For what the
 sentence says is that nothing has the former property without also having the
 latter. Nothing is being said of any class.
 It thus appears as if the whole confusion over (Dl) was due simply to the fact
 that Putnam deviates from established usage by saying 'class' where what he means
 is a property. Yet a closer examination of Putnam's theory reveals that what is
 involved is far from a mere terminological idiosyncracy.
 Let us look at (Dl) again. Granted that the definiendum is what a state descrip-
 tion S says about a property, the definition, though logically correct, seems distinctly
 counterintuitive. One would expect that what So says about the property P1 is
 no more and no less than that al and a3 have the property and that a2 lacks it.
 That al has P2, on the other hand, is naturally classified as information about P2,
 not about P1. Yet Putnam earmarks this information as information about P1.
 This counterintuitiveness of Putnam's basic concept reappears and is amplified
 in some of his further concepts, especially in that of the amount of information
 an arbitrary sentence gives about a property. The definition is as follows.
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 (D2) Let S be any sentence. Then the corresponding sentence Tc is obtained
 by (1) finding a disjunction of state descriptions which is equivalent
 to S; and (2) replacing each state description in the disjunction by a
 sentence which expresses what that state description says about C [see
 (Dl)].
 We now state:
 Let S and Tc be related as just described. Then, the amount of informa-
 tion S gives about C = df the amount of information of Tc
 (where the amount of information of a sentence is understood to be log2 of the
 total number of states of affairs minus log2 of the number of states of affairs in
 which the sentence comes out true).
 To see how counterintuitive this definition is, let us consider the following
 example. It is natural to expect the amount of information sentence P1(al) gives
 about the property P1 to be the same as the amount of information sentence
 P1(a1)P2(a2) gives about P1. For suppose that P1 and P2 are the respective properties
 of being a swan and of being black. Imagine that the only piece of information
 I possess is that a, is a swan, i.e. Pi(a1). Imagine furthermore that subsequently
 I acquire an additional piece of information to the effect that some other individual,
 a2, is black, i.e. P2(a2). It would be absurd to maintain that this additional piece
 of information will enhance my knowledge regarding swanhood. Yet this is
 exactly what happens according to (D2). A simple calculation reveals that on (D2),
 the amount of information P1(a1)P2(a2) gives about P1 (namely, 3-log23) strictly
 exceeds the amount of information P1(ai) gives about P1 (namely, 1).
 For a yet more striking example, consider Pi(al) and P2(a1)P2(a2)P3(a1)P3(a2).
 On (D2), the amounts of information the two sentences give about P1 are, respec-
 tively, 1 and 3-log23. Thus, taking Pi again to be swanhood, we obtain the perplex-
 ing result that a sentence, which says of a definite object that it is a swan, gives
 strictly less information about swanhood than does a sentence where the property
 is not even mentioned!
 It is not difficult to see that the fault lies with Putnam's basic definition (D1).
 As pointed out above, it is a mistake to hold that what a state description says
 about a property goes beyond the information it gives on the distribution of that
 property through the universe of discourse. There is, for instance, no reason to
 think that P2(a,) is part of what So says about P1.
 I can think of only one way to explain Putnam's error: by assuming that his
 irregular use of the term 'class' is not a gratuitous terminological eccentricity,
 but a symptom of the fact that the author does indeed think of sentences like So
 as statements about collections. For only if one thinks of So as speaking (inter alia)
 of the class {a,,a3}, may one be tempted to maintain that what So says about P,
 is not just P1(a1)P1(a3)P1(a2), but also whatever else So says about the two members
 of the class, a1 and a3.
 The meaning of Putnam's term 'class' thus seems to vacillate between 'collection'
 and 'property' and the author does not seem to realize that his definitions only
 make sense if the term is understood in the latter sense. A neglect of the distinction
 86
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 between classes and properties has led to a theory which is not only philosophically
 objectionable, but also materially inadequate.
 4. Individuals and individualsin--intension. The reason why sentence (1) cannot be
 about the planet Venus is parallel to the reason why (3) cannot be about the class
 {Mercury, Venus,..., Pluto}. Those who hold that (1) does treat of Venus, the
 celestial body, will probably agree with one another that what (1) says about the
 celestial body is (may be inter alia) that it is a planet. It is easily seen, however,
 that (1) might be true without that body's being a planet. For consider a world
 in which Mars instead of Venus is the brightest celestial body one can see in the
 morning sky and in which Venus fails to be a planet. Clearly there are possible
 worlds of this sort. But in any such world, (1) comes out true. Surely a sentence
 cannot come out true in a state of affairs where what it says is not the case. Hence
 what (1) says cannot be to the effect that Venus is a planet.
 As above, let P be the property of being a planet and M the individual-in-
 intension associated with the term 'the morning star'. M is thus a function which
 takes each possible world to the individual (if any) which is the morning star in
 that world. (1) is clearly true in a world W just in case the morning star of that
 world, i.e. MW, is in the extension of P in W, i.e. in PW. Thus the truth value
 of (1) in W is [PW][MW], and the proposition denoted by (1) can be constructed
 as
 (la) Aw. [Pw][Mw],
 where w ranges over possible worlds.
 I submit that (la) is the logical structure of (1). It differs substantially from the
 logical structure of (3), which, as we have seen, takes the form (3a). Whereas (3a)
 contains an individual term, V, (la) contains no such term. (3) treats of an
 individual-in-intension and a property: it treats of no individual.
 The fact that in (la) M is applied to a bound variable w is ill-reflected in the
 syntax of the corresponding ordinary language sentence (1). The surface structures
 of (1) and (3) obliterate the vast difference between their logical structures (la)
 and (3a). And the sloppiness of the ordinary language idiom is codified by the
 prevalent practice of symbolizing (1) and (3) uniformly as 'P(M)' and 'P(V)'. An
 illusion is thus created that (1), just as (3), attributes P to a specific individual.
 This erroneous analysis of (1) will probably be defended in the following way.
 Planets, it will be said, are individuals, not functions. Hence given that (1) is true,
 it must attribute planethood to an individual, rather than to a function M, as
 suggested above.
 This, however is like saying that the sentence 'sin 30? is less than 1' cannot be
 about the sine function because a function is not the sort of entity that may be
 less than 1. What has been suggested above is not the absurdity that (1) attributes
 planethood to the function M itself. On our analysis, (1) says this: the actual
 value of M-whichever individual this may be-is a planet. (1) ascribes planethood
 to the actual value of M leaving it open which particular individual it is, hence
 without mentioning any particular individual. (1) says that the actual value of M
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 falls within the class of actual planets. But for this to be the case, no particular
 individual needs to be a planet. For all (1) says, any individual may be the actual
 value of M.
 5. Goodmaono 'about'. What has been advocated in the foregoing section can be
 succinctly stated thus: a definitely descriptive term (like 'the morning star' or 'the
 tallest spy') does not denote the object which happens to answer the description
 but rather the function associating with each possible world the object which
 answers the description in that world. A sentence containing the term conveys
 information about this latter function rather than about the value the function
 takes in the actual world.
 Any definitely descriptive term can be put into the form 'the unique x such
 that x is a b', which is customarily abbreviated to '(x)Ox'. Hence, part of what
 has been argued for above can be stated thus: a sentence containing '(7x)Ox' is
 not about the unique object (if there be such) which actually happens to be a 6.
 The unqualified opposite view, namely the thesis that
 (D3) a sentence containing essentially a definite description is about the object
 which actually happens to answer the description,
 is well known to be untenable. For in conjunction with the natural requirement
 that logically equivalent sentences have the same subject matter, (D3) yields the
 absurd conclusion that every sentence is about everything. To see this, let us
 consider an arbitrary sentence S and show that, on (D3), S is about Chicago,
 the American city. First assume that S is true. S is logically equivalent to
 (5) Chicago = (x). (x = Chicago & S) V (x = Dallas & S).
 Note that the right-hand side of (5) constitutes an essential occurrence of a definite
 description fitting Chicago. Now consider the case where S is false. S is logically
 equivalent to
 (6) Dallas = (x). (x = Dallas & S) v (x = Chicago & S).
 Note that the right-hand side of (6) constitutes an essential occurrence of a definite
 description fitting Chicago. Thus in either case, S is logically equivalent to a
 sentence which, according to (D3), is about Chicago.
 There exists, however, a theory of 'about' which preserves the underlying idea
 of (D3) but precludes the simple counterargument just given. The theory was
 proposed by N. Goodman:
 (D4) Let us say that a statement T follows from S differentially with respect
 to k if T contains an expression designating k and follows logically from
 S, while no generalization of Twith respect to any part of that expression
 also follows logically from S. Then ... S is absolutely about k if and
 only if some statement T follows from S differentially with respect to k.
 ([1], p. 7)
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 On (D4), sentence (6), for instance, no longer qualifies as evidence that S is about
 Chicago, despite the fact that it follows logically from S and contains an expression
 designating Chicago. For the generalization
 (Vy). y = (x). (x = y & S) v (x = Chicago & S)
 of (6) with respect to 'Dallas' also follows from S.
 Goodman's requirement that T be generalizable with respect to no part of the
 expression designating k seems to me intuitively rather undermotivated, But credit
 is due to it for ingeniously barring simple counterexamples. The counterexample
 which follows is, as a result, somewhat involved.
 What we are going to show is that on (D4) the sentence 'Chicago is a city'
 is not only about Chicago, but also about Dallas and any other city on the globe.
 To begin with, let us consider the class L of terrestrial coordinates with integral
 values of degrees and minutes. L is thus a finite class of items like <30.58 N 49.01 E>,
 <68.64 S 172.12 W>, etc. Each city t is geographically located at a unique element-
 call it l(t)-of L. For instance, /(Chicago) = <41.50 N 87.45 W>.
 Let us fix a linear ordering < of L, say the lexicographical one. Thus for any
 two members a and b of L, we have a < b or b < a. Now we define three binary
 relations as follows:
 x < * f C(x) & C(y) & x = y & 1(x) < l(y) & -(3z)[C(z) &
 1(x) < l(z) < (Y)]
 (where C is the predicate 'is a city'),
 R(x,y) f X < *y V [x = y & -(3z)x < *z],
 RB(x,y) f Y < *x V [x = y & -(3z)x < *z].
 Now consider an arbitrary city Y other than Chicago. We shall show that
 according to (D4),
 (7) C(Chicago)
 is about Y.
 Case 1: 1(Chicago) < 1(Y). It is easy to see that there are cities xl, x2,..., xn such
 that Y (as a value of y) satisfies
 (4) RF(Chicago, x1) & RF(xI,x2) & . .. & RF(Xn X) & RF(xn,y).
 Moreover, for no city y other than Y it is possible to find x1,..., x, satisfying (D.
 In consequence, the term
 (4<*) (?y)(3x)3x2)... (3xn)D
 designates Y.
 It is not difficult to show that
 (8) (3z)RF(?*,z)
 follows logically from (7). Moreover, observe that 'Rp', 'Chicago', and t* itself
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 are the only components of (D* generalizable upon in (8). Writing ()*(RF, Chicago)




 But none of these follows logically from (7). Thus (8) follows from (7) differentially
 with respect to Y.
 Case 2: I(Y) < I(Chicago). We get a parallel result by using RB in lieu of RF.
 In either case, (7) is absolutely about the arbitrary city Y.
 Thus, although it is more tedious to demonstrate it, (D4) fares no better than
 (D3).
 6. Actuality. All the fallacies concerning the referents of descriptive terms like
 'planet', 'the number of planets', 'the morning star', etc. spring from a common
 source: a subtle error concerning the nature of actuality. The error is most con-
 veniently diagnosed in connection with terms like 'planet' and 'red'; but the diag-
 nosis carries easily over to terms of other categories.
 It has become a stock item of conventional philosophical wisdom to hold that
 a collection of objects can be specified in two different ways. One can specify
 the elements, i.e. to stipulate in regard of each individual whether it belongs to
 the collection or not. Alternatively, it is held, one can specify a property and stipu-
 late that the class in question is the one formed by all, and only, the individuals
 which instantiate that property.
 In the English language the term 'red' is obviously associated with a property,
 namely the property of being red. Now if it were true that this property determines
 a unique collection, it would be only natural to hold that someone who utters
 the term 'red' employs the property to refer to the collection specified by the
 property. It would be natural to hold that 'red' denotes the collection while the
 property itself has only to do with the peculiar manner in which 'red' denotes the
 collection.
 But is it true that by specifying a property one specifies a class ? Let us observe
 that it would be ridiculous to maintain that one can specify a number by specifying
 a function which takes that number as one of its values. 0.5, for instance, is not
 specified by saying that it is in the range of the sine function. To specify a number
 by way of a function one must cite, besides the function itself, a definite argument.
 Thus 0.5 can be specified as the value of sine at 30 degrees. A property, we know,
 is a function mapping possible worlds into classes. Hence to specify a class by
 way of a property one must cite, besides the property itself, a definite world.
 Thus where W is a definite world, a class can be specified as the class of individuals
 which are red in the world W.
 Thus far almost everybody will agree. "Yes," it will be said, "in specifying a
 class through a property one must, strictly speaking, also specify a world. But
 there is no difficulty here. For it is obviously understood that the requisite world
 is the actual one, the one which actually obtains."
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 But which particular world is the actual one? Do we know? To determine
 which one of the vast range of conceivable worlds is actualized seems to be the
 ultimate object of science. Whether this object is attainable or not, we can rest
 assured that it has not been attained yet. All we have (hopefully) achieved so
 far is to set some of the worlds aside as definitely nonactual. But of those that
 remain any-for all we know-may be the actual one.
 It is easy to see that knowing which possible world is actualized is tantamount
 to omniscience. For someone who knows the identity of the actual world can
 readily determine the actual truth value of any given proposition (i.e. a function
 from possible worlds to truth values) by simply taking the value of the proposition
 at that world. Now this is certainly not a position we can assume ourselves to
 be in. But then we must concede that we do not know which world is actual.
 It follows that someone who speaks of the extension of redness in the actual
 world specifies no particular class: he has cited a property, but no particular world.
 Unless, of course, we allow for the absurdity of someone citing an item without
 having the faintest idea which item he cites.
 This absurdity is commonly condoned. One is committed to it whenever one
 treats the term 'the actual world' as a name of a world. For if the term denoted
 the world which happens to be actual, then whoever uttered, say, the sentence
 (9) Venus is a planet in the actual world
 simply could not know what he was talking about. He would mention a world,
 being in no position to find out which one. Yet (9) is clearly tantamount to (3),
 whose subject matter is plagued with no elusive element of this sort.
 The truth of the matter is that 'the actual world' is not a name of a particular
 world any more than 'the morning star' is a name of a planet. Rather than a
 world, the actual world is something that this, that, or the other world may be:
 it is a status which worlds may enjoy. The actual world, in other words, is a world-
 in-intension, i.e. a function, call it '@', taking possible worlds to possible worlds.
 The value of @ at a world W is the world which is actual in W. And it is easy
 enough to see which world is actual in a given world W: W itself. @ is thus seen
 to be the identity function defined on the family of possible worlds. And this
 function-something we are perfectly familiar with-is what the term 'the actual
 world' stands for. Thus it is that when uttering (9) we know perfectly well what
 we are talking about. And thus it is that (9) is tantamount to (3). For (9) is clearly
 true in a world W if Venus, V, belongs to the extension of planethood, P, in the
 world which is actual in W, i.e. in @ W. This extension is clearly P[@ W], so the
 truth value of (9) in W is [P[@ W]] V. Thus the proposition denoted by (9) can be
 constructed as
 (9a) Aw . [P[@w]]V.
 But since @ is an identity function, (9a) is the same proposition as (3a), which we
 have seen to be the proposition denoted by (3).
 Unfortunately, the misconstrual of the term 'the actual world' as a name of
 a world is fostered by many possible-world semanticists. The most notable example
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 of this attitude is David Lewis's theory of actuality expounded in [2]. Lewis treats
 the term 'the actual world' as just another indexical term:
 I suggest that "actual" and its cognates should be analyzed as indexical
 terms: terms whose reference varies, depending on the relevant features of the
 context of utterance. The relevant features of context, for the term "actual,"
 is the world at which a given utterance occurs. According to the indexical
 analysis I propose, "actual" ... refers at any world w to the world w. ...
 "Actual" is analogous also to "here," "I," "you," "this," and "afore-
 mentioned"-indexical terms depending for their reference respectively on
 the place, the speaker, the intended audience, the speaker's acts of pointing,
 and the foregoing discourse. ([2], pp. 184-185)
 Yet there seems a world of difference between 'this', 'now', 'here', 'I', 'you'
 and the like on the one hand, and 'the actual world' on the other. By pointing his
 index finger at an object and saying 'this', a speaker directly selects a definite
 item in his environment and makes it perfectly clear to himself and to his audience
 precisely which particular item is being spoken of. The same goes for 'I, 'now'
 and other indexical terms. By saying 'the actual world', on the other hand, one
 is not selecting a particular world. What one directly brings up for consideration
 is a certain idiosyncratic feature-actuality. This feature is bound to be had by
 some world or other but one leaves it, as it were, to the hard facts to decide which
 particular world it is. In this, 'the actual world' is rather like 'the tallest spy'.
 By saying 'the tallest spy' one is not selecting a particular person. What one directly
 brings up for consideration is a certain feature-that of being a spy taller than
 all other spies. This feature is, in all likelihood, had by a unique person, but one
 leaves it to the facts to decide which particular person it is. But terms like 'the
 tallest spy' are invariably classified as nonindexical.2
 It is also palpably counterintuitive to count the identity of the possible world
 in which an utterance is made among the contextual features relevant to that
 utterance. For contextual features are those aspects of the circumstances in which
 an utterance is made which partly determine the force of the utterance, i.e. what
 is being said. Typically, such features are (a) ascertainable by all parties to a success-
 ful communication, and (b) determinative only of the content of a communication,
 not of its truth value. The identity of the actual world meets neither of the two
 conditions. As for (a), we know that, barring omniscience, the actual world is
 known neither to the speaker nor to his audience. And as for (b), if one knew the
 identity of the actual world, one would not only know what has been said, one
 would ipso facto know as well whether what has been said (or indeed any other
 proposition) is true or false.
 If the knowledge of the actual world was one of the preconditions of grasping
 the message carried by an utterance, communication would be pointless. For if
 2 Incidentally, it is difficult to see why terms like 'the tallest spy' do not figure among Lewis's
 paradigms of indexical terms. It seems that on his view, the term 'the tallest spy' refers to one
 person or another depending on the world at which it is uttered. And this, according to the
 above quotation, is enough for a term to be an indexical one.
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 one did not possess that knowledge, the message would escape him. And if one
 did possess it, the message could not enlighten him.3
 3 The author is indebted to Martin Fricke for a number of helpful suggestions.
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